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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether intellectual capital (IC) and financial disclosures jointly affect the 
firm’s cost of equity capital. In contrast to prior research, we disaggregate disclosures into IC and 
financial disclosures and examine whether the two disclosure types are jointly related to the cost of 
equity capital. We also investigate whether IC and financial disclosures have an interaction effect on the 
cost of equity capital. Using data for a sample of 125 UK firms, we find a negative relationship 
between the cost of equity capital and IC disclosure. We find that the relationship between financial 
disclosure and the cost of equity capital is magnified when combined with IC disclosure. 
Additionally, we find that IC and financial disclosures interact in shaping their effects on the cost of 
equity capital. Further analyses suggest that the effect of financial disclosure on the cost of equity 
capital is augmented for firms characterised by a medium level of IC disclosure. These results 
provide important insights into the relationship between disclosures and cost of equity capital and 
have policy and practical implications.   
 
Key words: cost of equity capital; intellectual capital disclosure; financial disclosure; disclosure 
interactions.   
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1. Introduction 
This study examines the economic consequences of disclosure on a sample of UK listed firms. 
Specifically, we disaggregate annual report disclosures into intellectual capital (IC) and financial 
disclosures and investigate whether the two disclosure types are jointly related to the cost of equity 
capital.
1
 We further analyse whether IC and financial disclosures interact in their effects on the cost 
of equity capital. Theoretically, disclosure reduces the cost of capital through either a reduction in 
estimation risk on the investor’s part (see Easley and O’Hara, 2004) or transactions costs resulting 
from lower information asymmetry (see Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007). Several empirical 
studies apply these theoretical perspectives to examine the relationship between disclosure and cost 
of capital. In an extensive review of such studies, Healy and Palepu (2001) and Botosan (2006) 
conclude that the evidence on the link is mixed.
2
 More strikingly, Botosan’s (2006) review also 
points to different disclosure types affecting the cost of capital in different ways. In this context, the 
authors call for further research to help us understand the cost of capital effects of disclosure. In this 
paper, we respond to these calls by examining the IC disclosure effects on the cost of equity capital.  
We depend on prior literature for most of the ideas underlying our study (see section 2 for 
details of the literature). In summary, the prior literature points to firms’ heavy investments in IC 
assets
3
 in today’s knowledge-based economy, and notes the investors’ growing demand for 
information about these IC assets in the process of valuing shares (Lev, 2001; Holland, 2003). This 
demand for IC information is underpinned by the notion that IC assets are an integral part of the 
firm’s value-creating processes (Holland, 2003) and are important for creating and maintaining 
                                                 
1 IC is defined by CIMA (2001, p. 2) as “…the possession of knowledge and experience, professional knowledge and skill, good 
relationships, and technological capacities, which when applied will give organisations competitive advantage.” It comprises three 
major categories: human capital, structural capital and relational capital (Guthrie, Petty and Ricceri, 2007; Beattie and Thomson, 2007).  
2For example, some studies document a negative relationship between the cost of capital and aggregate disclosure (e.g., Hail, 2002; 
Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 2005), timely disclosure (e.g., Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005), whilst others 
show a positive relationship with timely disclosures (quarterly reports) (e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) and social disclosures (e.g., 
Richardson and Welker, 2001), yet others show a negative relationship with financial disclosure, but only for firms with low analyst 
following (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001). 
3 Such IC assets include research and development, brand development, franchises, customer-base creation, advertising, human capital 
and corporate image. 
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competitive advantage (Keller, 2002), and contributing to superior performance (Walsh et al., 2009). 
The literature (e.g., Holland, 2003) also argues that IC assets combine and interact with physical and 
financial assets to create firm value in unique ways. In this context, there are studies demonstrating 
that information about IC assets helps the investor to (1) improve their interpretation of the financial 
results (Luft and Shields, 2001) and (2) better understand the future cash flow generating capabilities 
of the firm (Amir and Lev, 1996). To the extent that IC assets create value in the firm, and that the 
information about IC assets is important to investors, we expect greater IC disclosure to lower the 
cost of equity capital.  
We employ a sample of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and estimate the 
firm’s cost of equity capital using the modified price-earnings growth (PEG) model (Easton, 2004). 
Our proxy for the two disclosure measures is a coded index of IC and financial information from 
firms’ annual reports. We find that IC disclosure is negatively related to the cost of equity capital. We 
also find that the relationship between financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital is magnified 
when combined with IC disclosure. Additionally, we observe that IC and financial disclosures 
interact on their effects on the cost of equity capital. An analysis of this interaction demonstrates that 
the effect of financial disclosure on the cost of equity capital is augmented for firms characterised by 
a medium level of IC disclosure. These results are robust to alternative estimates of the cost of equity 
capital.
4
 Our results are new, and demonstrate the importance of disaggregating disclosure into IC 
and financial information in understanding the disclosure-cost of capital relationship. 
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, we disaggregate annual report 
disclosure into IC and financial disclosures to understand whether they individually and jointly 
influence the cost of equity capital. Prior studies have examined aggregate disclosures (see Francis, 
Khurana and Pereira, 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007). The focus on aggregate disclosure 
                                                 
4 To test the robustness of our results, we also employ the abnormal earnings growth model (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005) to 
estimate the cost of capital and find similar results. 
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means that the impact of different disclosure types on the cost of capital is not well understood.
5
 
Second, by examining both IC and financial disclosures in a single study, we address the problem of 
omitted variables suffered by studies examining a specific (single) disclosure type (e.g., Gietzmann 
and Ireland, 2005). As Amir and Lev (1996, p.4) argue, the focus on aggregate disclosure or a single 
disclosure type is “...restrictive and may lead to unwarranted conclusions”. Third, our study offers a 
significant development to three studies examining IC disclosure and the cost of capital (Singh and 
Van der Zahn, 2007; Kristandl and Bontis, 2007; Orens, Aerts and Lybaert, 2009). Unlike Singh and 
Van der Zahn (2007) who uses under-pricing as an indirect measure of cost of capital, we estimate 
the cost of equity capital by employing the modified price-earnings growth (PEG) model (Easton, 
2004), which is widely used in the literature (see Botosan and Plumlee, 2005). Both Singh and Van 
der Zahn (2007) and Orens, Aerts and Lybaert (2009) consider IC disclosure only, hence their models 
are incomplete as they do not control for other disclosures. Finally, similar to Kristandl and Bontis 
(2007), we model both IC and financial disclosures in our analyses, and extend their study by 
investigating whether the disclosure measures interact to affect the cost of equity capital.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of literature and 
formulates the hypotheses. In section 3, we specify our model, and describe how we developed the 
cost of equity capital and disclosure measures. In section 4, we describe the sample selection 
procedure and provide the descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical results of the study 
and reports on additional analyses. Finally, section 6 offers some concluding remarks to the study. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 For example, consider two firms. Firm A discloses 60% IC and 40% financial information, and firm B discloses 40% IC and 60% 
financial information. Assuming equal weighting, each firm’s average aggregate disclosure score would be about 50%. Let us say firm 
A’s cost of capital is 10% and B’s is 15%. In this scenario, if we model with aggregate disclosure, there will be no relationship between 
disclosure and the cost of capital. However, modelling with individual disclosure types is likely to result in disclosure variations and a 
better understanding how these affect the cost of capital. 
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2. Literature review and hypotheses  
2.1 Prior literature 
The notion that disclosure affects the cost of capital is driven by two streams of theoretical literature 
(see Healy and Palepu, 2001 for a review). One stream argues that information asymmetry introduces 
adverse selection into transactions between buyers and sellers (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). This 
reduces market liquidity in the firm’s shares and, therefore, firms will be forced to issue shares at a 
discount because investors pay less for shares with high transaction costs (Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986; Welker, 1995). Firms can lower the discount at which their shares are issued by improving 
disclosure (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) because enhanced disclosure reduces the incentives by 
investors to acquire costly private information (Welker, 1995). The second stream posits that greater 
disclosure results in a reduction of the estimation risk associated with the share’s return. A reduction 
in estimation risk lowers investors’ required rate of return (Coles, Loewenstein and Suay, 1995; 
Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2007). Thus, from a theoretical perspective, the consensus is that 
there is a negative relationship between disclosure and the cost of capital.  
Whilst there is theoretical consensus, the empirical literature on the relationship is mixed, and 
most importantly for our study, suggests that the relationship between disclosure and the cost of 
capital depends on the type of disclosure (see Botosan, 2006). Botosan (1997) and Richardson and 
Welker (2001) document a negative relationship between the cost of capital and financial disclosure, 
but only for firms with low (but not high) analyst following. In their study, Richardson and Welker 
(2001) also examine social disclosure and find a positive relationship with social disclosure. In a 
study similar to Botosan (1997), Hail (2002) finds a negative relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and the cost of capital for a sample of Swiss firms. Botosan and Plumlee (2002) document 
that the cost of capital decreases with increased annual report disclosures, but increases with 
quarterly report disclosure. In the UK, Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) document a negative 
relationship between the cost of capital and strategic disclosures, but only for firms adopting 
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aggressive (but not conservative) accounting policies. Espinosa and Trombetta (2007) find similar 
results for a sample of Spanish firms. Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2005) use cross-country data and 
document a lower cost of capital for firms with greater disclosures. Finally, Muino and Trombetta 
(2009) provide evidence suggesting that graph disclosure has a reducing effect on the cost of capital.  
Our study is closely related to Singh and Van der Zahn (2007), Kristandl and Bontis (2007) and 
Orens, Aerts and Lybaert (2009). Singh and Van der Zahn (2007) provide evidence of a positive 
relationship between IC disclosure and the cost of capital of initial public offering (IPO) firms. 
However, their proxy for the cost of capital, under-pricing, is problematic, because it does not capture 
the cost of capital efficiently due to events arising at the time of the share issues. Further, results from 
using IPO firms may not be applicable to seasoned firms. By nature, IPO firms have greater 
uncertainty due to their higher failure rates (Fama and French, 2004). Kristandl and Bontis (2007) 
examine firms in four European countries and find a negative relationship between the cost of capital 
and forward-looking disclosures, and a positive relationship with financial disclosures. However, for 
their cost of capital, they use the Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001) model which is criticised 
for producing estimates that fail to efficiently relate to risk factors (see Botosan, 2006). Orens, Aerts 
and Lybaert (2009) use web-based IC disclosures and find a negative relationship with the cost of 
capital, but they do not examine whether financial and IC disclosures are jointly and interactively 
related to the cost of equity capital.  
   
2.2 Hypotheses 
We draw from the theoretical and empirical research to develop our hypotheses. As argued in prior 
literature, investments in IC assets are critical for firm value creation (see Pike, Rylander and Roos, 
2002; Holland, 2003; 2006) and creating and sustaining superior performance (see Holland, 2006; 
Walsh et al., 2009; Hsu and Wang, 2012). Keller (2002) argues, for example, that advertising 
expenditures promote brand equity, which creates firm value via increasing customer creation and 
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loyalty and therefore enhanced cash flows and profitability. Consequently, information about these 
IC investments is an important factor in the process of valuing shares by investors. For example, 
Holland (2003; 2006) concludes, after interviewing fund managers and analysts, that the market 
demands IC information and has incentives to create and use the information on the role of IC in 
corporate value-creation when making investment decisions. Rajgopal, Shevlin and Venkatachalam 
(2003) provide evidence showing that analysts consider IC information when they make earnings 
forecasts. Garcia-Meca and Martinez (2007) show that information about investments in IC assets 
feature significantly in analyst reports. Other studies show that specific IC indicators such as research 
and development expenses (Amir and Lev, 1996), software development costs (Aboody and Lev, 
1998) and customer satisfaction (Ittner and Larcker, 1998) have an impact on share prices.  
The problem, however, is that under existing Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP), investments in IC assets are either immediately expensed in the financial statements or 
arbitrarily amortised and therefore are not fully reflected in the financial statements (Amir and Lev, 
1996; Lev, 2001). This means that whilst investors are informed about financial assets, information 
asymmetry still exists because investors are not fully informed about the productivity of the 
investment in IC assets (Barth, Kasznik and McNichols, 2001; Holland, 2003). As Aboody and Lev 
(2000) argue, the information asymmetry is more acute for investments in IC than for investments in 
physical and financial assets because IC is unique to specific firms. The problem is compounded by 
the absence of regulatory requirements to disclose IC information. Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis 
(2001) argue that lack of information about IC investments complicates the task of equity valuation 
by investors and may affect their ability to anticipate the rewards of investments in IC assets and, 
therefore under-price the firm’s shares. In this respect, greater disclosure of IC information improves 
investors’ understanding of the productivity and value changes of IC assets (Beattie and Thomson, 
2007; Guthrie, Petty and Ricceri, 2007) and the economic risks attached to the firm’s future cash 
flows (Coles, Loewenstein and Suay, 1995). This should lead to improvement in capital market 
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efficiency, which reduces the uncertainty premium required by investors when making decisions to 
invest in a firm (Aboody and Lev, 2000; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). Thus, from a theoretical 
perspective, improving IC disclosure reduces information asymmetry (Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991), lowers estimation risk (Coles, Loewenstein and Suay, 1995) and reduces the cost of capital.  
Pike, Rylander and Roos (2002), Nagar and Rajan (2001) and Holland (2006) argue that IC 
assets combine and interact with physical and financial assets in unique ways to create firm value. In 
this context, investors would also gain additional insights by integrating IC and financial information 
in making decisions. Indeed as Amir and Lev (1996) demonstrate, book values, earnings and cash 
flows are value relevant only when combined with IC related information. Chan, Lakonishok and 
Sougiannis (2001) and Luft and Shields (2001) find that IC information improves interpretation of 
financial results by market participants. Luft and Shields (2001), in particular, find that market 
participants felt uncertain about making good judgements on firm profits in the absence of IC 
information. They argue that the provision of IC information might mitigate the uncertainty by 
investors. In line with this literature, Gietzmann and Trombetta (2003) argue that investors condition 
their investment decisions on different disclosures as well as on other potential message spaces such 
as accounting policy choice. In this case, they argue that investors may also consider, in addition to 
disclosures, whether a firm adopts conservative or aggressive accounting policies. Gietzmann and 
Ireland (2005) and Espinosa and Trombetta (2007) provide empirical evidence demonstrating that 
disclosure interacts with accounting policy choice to influence the cost of equity capital. Muino and 
Trombetta (2009) also find that there is an interaction between graph disclosure bias and overall 
disclosure in their effect on the cost of capital. In this context, we argue that investors would also 
rationally form their view about the firm’s future cash flow generating capabilities by considering 
both IC and financial information. Hence, we hypothesise the following (in null form): 
 
H1:  There is no difference between the cost of equity capital of firms that provide greater IC 
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disclosures and those firms that do not. 
H2: There is no difference between the cost of equity capital of firms that provide greater 
financial disclosures and those firms that do not. 
H3: There is no interaction between financial disclosures and IC disclosures in their effect on 
the cost of equity capital. 
 
3. Research methods 
3.1 The empirical model 
Following previous work (e.g., Botosan, Plumlee and Xie, 2004; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005; 
Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007), we estimate the following regression model:  
𝐾𝑃𝐸𝐺    = 0 + 1RFDI + 2RICDI + 3RFDI*RICDI + 4LnSIZE + 5BETA  
+ 6LEV + 7LnB2M + 8ACCOREPUT  + j,     (1)  
  
Where 𝐾𝑃𝐸𝐺   is the implied cost of equity capital for the firm, measured using the modified price 
earnings growth (PEG) model (see section 3.2). RFDI and RICDI represent the ranks of financial and IC 
disclosure indexes, respectively, both measured as discussed in section 3.3 below. RFDI*RICDI is the 
interaction term computed as the product of the ranks of FDI and ICDI (see also, Botosan, Plumlee and 
Xie, 2004; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007; Muino and Trombetta, 2009). Although our main variables 
are disclosure and the cost of equity capital, consistent with prior studies, our model also controls for 
natural log of firm size (LnSIZE), market risk (BETA), financial leverage (LEV) and natural log of 
book-to-market ratio (LnB2M) to control for known risk factors (see Easton, 2004).
6
 Consistent with 
prior literature (Botosan, 1997; Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 2005), we expect firm size to be 
negatively related to the cost of equity capital. Our size variable (LnSize) is measured as the firm’s 
                                                 
6 Data for measuring all control variables, except BETA, are drawn from the annual reports at the financial year end as well as 
Thomson Research. Firms’ beta values are drawn from the Risk Measurement Service, a quarterly publication by the London Business 
School’s Institute of Finance and Accounting. The beta values obtained are for the quarter preceding the annual report publication date. 
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natural log of market capitalisation at the financial year end. We also expect market risk (Hail, 2002; 
Botosan, Plumlee and Xie, 2004), financial leverage (Botosan, 1997; Easton, 2004) and book-to-market 
ratio (Botosan, Plumlee and Xie, 2004; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005) to be positively associated with 
the cost of equity capital. We measure financial leverage as the total liabilities scaled by the market 
capitalisation at the year-end (see Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007). The 
book-to-market ratio is computed by scaling the book value of the firm’s equity by the market 
capitalisation (Botosan, Plumlee and Xie, 2004), both measured at the financial year end. Following 
recent literature demonstrating a link between corporate social responsibility and the cost of capital 
(e.g., Guenster et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Cheah et al., 2011), we also control for firm’s 
accountability reputation (ACCOREPUT). We measure ACCOREPUT as a dummy taking the value 
of 1 if the firm is included in the FTSE4Good Index, 0 otherwise.
7
     
 
3.2 Cost of equity capital proxy 
The literature has developed valuation models to estimate the cost of capital implied by mean analyst 
earnings forecasts and current share prices. The main valuation models are the residual income 
valuation (RIV) model (Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan, 2001), the abnormal earnings growth 
(AEG) model (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005; Gode and Mohanram, 2003) and the modified 
price-earnings growth (PEG) model (Easton, 2004). We employ the PEG model for three reasons. 
First, Cooper (2006) argues that in studying the disclosure-cost of capital relationship, it is not the 
accuracy of the absolute measure of the cost of capital that matters, but the relative differences in the 
cost of capital estimates. Therefore, the valuation model is not the most important issue as long as 
                                                 
7 With the increasing growth of the socially responsible investment agenda, large institutional investors increasingly show a preference 
for firms pursuing socially responsible activities (Guenster et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Cheah et al., 2011), and indices such as 
FTSE4Good are increasingly being used by investors (Galema, Plantinga and Scholtens, 2008). The FTSE4Good Index was founded in 
2001 and provides investors interested in integrating social responsibility issues into the investment decisions with a transparent and 
measurable benchmark. It captures firms’ environmental, social and governance practices (ESG). The index only includes firms that 
perform well in all areas of ESG. In this context, the use of the index allows us not only to control for corporate social responsibility, 
but also for the quality of corporate governance, variables that prior research suggest affect the cost of equity capital (see Cheng, 
Collins and Huang, 2006; El Ghoul et al., 2011). 
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there are sufficient variations in the estimates among firms. Second, the PEG model has less onerous 
data requirements, and only requires share prices and analyst earnings forecasts. Finally, prior studies 
(Botosan and Plumlee, 2005; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007) indicate that the cost of capital 
estimates obtained from the three alternative approaches (RIV, AEG and PEG) are fairly similar and 
positively correlated.  
The PEG model (Easton, 2004) estimates the cost of equity capital as follows:
 8
 
𝐾𝑃𝐸𝐺   =    √
𝑒𝑝𝑠2−𝑒𝑝𝑠1
𝑃0
           (2) 
Where: 𝑒𝑝𝑠2 is the two-year-ahead analysts’ earnings forecast for the firm; 𝑒𝑝𝑠1 is the one-
year-ahead analysts’ earnings forecast for the firm; and 𝑃0 
is the current share price. Both 𝑒𝑝𝑠1 and 
𝑒𝑝𝑠2 must be positive and 𝑒𝑝𝑠2  must be greater than 𝑒𝑝𝑠1  (Easton, 2004; Lee, Walker and 
Christensen, 2006). We obtain the share prices and analyst earnings forecasts data from Datastream’s 
I/B/E/S. We collect analyst forecasts made after the release of the annual report to ensure that the 
analyst forecasts incorporate information from the annual reports (see Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005; 
Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007).  
 
3.3 Disclosure measures 
The data for measuring disclosure is drawn from annual reports published between March 2004 and 
February 2005. We deliberately chose a cut-off of February 2005 to ensure that we reduce possible 
disclosure effects of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and Operating and 
Financial Review (OFR) requirements, which were to become mandatory from period beginning 
                                                 
8 In computing the cost of equity capital, the PEG model assumes no dividend pay-out and no growth in abnormal earnings beyond the 
forecast horizon. For details of the model, in particular, how the model is derived, we refer the reader to the paper by Easton (2004). In 
further analyses, we also use cost of capital measures estimated using the AEG model to test the robustness of our results and find 
results that are similar to those of the PEG model. 
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2005 (the decision to make the OFR mandatory was later repealed in 2006).
9
 Although there are other 
channels through which firms report information, such as the internet and analyst meetings, the use of 
the annual report to measure corporate disclosure is well justified in the literature. For example, it is 
mandatory and widely distributed by listed firms (Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995), and is the main 
channel by which firms communicate with investors and other stakeholders (Bozzolan, O’Regan and 
Ricceri, 2005; Guthrie, Petty and Ricceri, 2007). Eng and Teo (2000) show that analysts do revise 
their earnings forecasts after the release of annual reports, whilst Hope (2003) documents a positive 
relationship between annual report disclosure and analysts’ earnings forecasts accuracy.  
We create two measures of disclosure for the analysis: IC disclosure and financial disclosure. 
Our focus is on voluntary disclosure to ensure that we differentiate firms. We develop our disclosure 
measures as follows. For IC disclosure, we apply the checklist developed by Li, Pike and Haniffa 
(2008). This comprehensive checklist comprises 61 voluntary IC items divided into human, relational 
and structural items (see Appendix A, Panel A). We develop the financial disclosure checklist from a 
review of literature (e.g., Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1995; Botosan, 1997; Mangena and Pike, 2005), 
regulatory requirements (i.e., accounting standards; listing rules) and this yielded 35 items (see 
Appendix A, Panel B). We then read the entire annual report to score the items on the checklist and 
develop a measure of disclosure. For both IC and financial information, we use a binary indicator 
value, assuming 1 (for yes) and 0 (for no) if an information item is disclosed or not disclosed in the 
annual report, respectively. In this case, the method we use captures the presence or absence of a 
disclosure item in the annual report.
10
 We then create a disclosure index for each firm by dividing the 
                                                 
9 Our decision was driven by the need to examine the effects of IC and financial disclosures on the cost of capital in an environment of 
voluntary instead of mandatory reporting and the period chosen is particularly appropriate. This is particularly important because 
multiple regressions work well when there are meaningful variability in the variables of interest, in this case IC and financial 
disclosures and the cost of equity capital (see Richardson and Welker, 2001). In a mandatory reporting environment, variability of IC 
and financial disclosure is likely to be very small, thus making the results less powerful. In our view, as long as there is variability in 
the disclosure scores, the use of most recent data should lead to findings similar to those reported in this study. We believe the results 
from the analyses are important, not only for firms and policy-makers, but also for understanding the relationship between disclosure 
and the cost of equity capital.  
10 Our approach takes into account the applicability of an item to the firm, such that firms are not penalised for items that are not 
considered applicable. For example, where the financial statements include amounts on disposals of assets or a subsidiary, we would 
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sum of disclosures (all the 1s) by the total number of items scored (total count of all the 1s and 0s) 
(see also Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002).
11
 
 
4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
4.1 Sample description  
Our sample of firms is drawn from UK firms listed on the LSE. We begin the sample selection 
procedure by obtaining a list of all firms listed on the LSE as at 31 March 2008. Since our focus is on 
UK firms, we eliminate all overseas firms because they may be subjected to additional disclosure 
requirements by their national regulators (Mangena and Pike, 2005). We also exclude firms that were 
listed after the February 2005 cut-off date and those that had not yet produced their first annual 
report. The resultant population size is 522 firms (see Table 1), and for a sample population of this 
size, Neuman (2003) suggests a sample size of 30% (approximately 157 firms). To ensure a widely 
representative sample across industries, we apply proportionate stratified sampling by systematically 
selecting one firm from every three (522 divided by 157) firms in each industry.
12
 The resultant 
sample size is 163 firms. Given that we use I/B/E/S data, this list was submitted to Thomson’s 
Datastream for the requisite data, following which we eliminated 38 firms due to missing or 
insufficient data. This yielded a final sample of 125 firms as shown in Table 1, of which 37 firms are 
included in the FTSE4Good Index.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                    
expect a ‘discussion of disposals and  effects on the results’ in the report, and the firm would be awarded a ‘1’ score if discussed; ‘0’ 
otherwise. Where no amounts on disposals or acquisitions are included in the financial statements, we assume that the item ‘discussion 
of disposals and effects on results’ is not applicable.  
11 We validate our disclosure measures in two ways. First, three independent experienced coders score 15 randomly selected annual 
reports. The correlation among the scores by the three coders was significantly high at 0.98. Second, following Botosan (1997) and 
Richardson and Welker (2001), we regress the disclosure scores against firm size, leverage, return on assets, multiple listing, analyst 
following, and listing age. These variables have been shown to be associated with disclosure (Richardson and Welker, 2001; Mangena 
and Pike, 2005; Li, Pike and Haniffa, 2008) and if our disclosure scores are valid, they should be related to these variables. Our results 
are generally consistent with these previous studies. The results of these tests conservatively assure us that our disclosure measures are 
valid. 
12 The use of proportionate stratified sampling was to ensure that we build a sample that is representative of the population, both in 
terms of the sectors and the size of the firms. We considered that as the number of firms in each industry group is not the same simple 
random sampling will not meet this objective. To ensure that our sample includes both large and small firms, we first ranked firms in 
each sector by market capitalisation and then systematically selected one firm from every three firms in each industry grouping.  
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  INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics   
In Table 2, we present summary descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A provides the statistics 
for the cost of equity capital, IC and financial disclosures and control variables, and Panel B presents 
the cost of equity capital and disclosure statistics by industry. The mean (median) value of the cost of 
equity capital (𝐾𝑃𝐸𝐺   ) is 9.95% (9.02%), which, although marginally lower, is consistent with the 
10.4% reported by Lee, Walker and Christensen (2006) and the 10.7% reported by Gietzmann and 
Ireland (2005) also for listed UK firms. The mean (median) disclosure scores are 70.0% (72.1%) and 
46.3% (46.7%) for IC disclosure (ICDI) and financial disclosure (FDI), respectively. In terms of 
industries (Panel B), firms in the telecommunications service, IT, aerospace, utility, media and 
publishing, business service providers and banks and insurance sectors have higher cost of capital 
than other firms. These sectors, with the exception of utility, appear to provide greater levels of IC 
disclosure, but their financial disclosures are similar to other sectors.   
For the control variables, the mean market capitalisation (SIZE) of £6,047.1 million and the 
median market value of £655.2 million, indicate that our sample is characterised by both large and 
small firms. From the mean (median) BETA values of 0.998 (1.020), it is clear that the level of the 
sample market risk is close to that of the market portfolio. In terms of financial leverage, the mean 
(median) leverage of 19.6% (14.9%) is consistent with the notion that UK firms generally do not rely 
heavily on debt financing (see Lee, Walker and Christensen, 2006). The book-to-market ratio (B2M) 
mean (median) value of 0.474 (0.397) suggest that the market values are substantially different from 
the book values. 
 
  INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
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5. Empirical results  
In this section, we present the empirical results of our study. We first report the univariate analysis in 
section 5.1 and then in section 5.2, we present our multiple regression results.  
 
5.1 Univariate analysis   
Table 3 reports the correlations between the independent variables and dependent variable as well as 
among the independent variables. The table shows that the cost of equity capital is significantly and 
negatively related to each measure of disclosure: the ranks of IC disclosure index (RICDI) and 
financial disclosure index (RFDI). We also note that although the correlations among the independent 
variables are significant, multicollinearity is not a problem because they are below the 0.7 benchmark 
(Gujarati, 2003).
13
   
  
  INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE    
 
5.2 Multiple regression results 
We first rank both IC and financial disclosure scores to alleviate the effects of extreme observations 
consistent with prior studies (see Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002; Francis, Khurana and Pereira, 2005; 
Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007). Similarly, to reduce the impact of outliers, we winsorise the cost of 
equity capital data at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution (as in Lee, Walker and Christensen, 
2006; Muino and Trombetta, 2009).
14
 Section 5.2.1 presents the main results, and in section 5.2.2, we 
provide the results of robustness tests. 
                                                 
13 Additional checks included an examination of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) in our model to further test for multicollinearity. 
All VIFs are well below the threshold value of 10 indicating that multicollinearity does not pose a problem (Gujarati, 2003). We also 
compute condition index using eigenvalues of the independent variables correlation matrix. As a rule of thumb, a condition index 
below 30 suggests no cause for concern and, a condition index of over 30 indicates the presence of collinearity (Gujarati, 2003). The 
largest condition index is 15.8, which is well below the threshold. 
14 We also run the regressions with raw disclosure measures and the cost of equity capital as in Francis, Khurana and Pereira (2005) 
and find that the results are similar.  
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5.2.1 IC disclosure, financial disclosure and cost of equity capital 
The results of the relationship between the cost of equity capital and IC and financial disclosures are 
presented in Table 4.   
 
    INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
We first run the regression including the control variables only (Model 1) to establish whether our 
cost of equity capital estimates are related to the traditional risk factors in the predicted fashion, thus 
also validating the cost of equity capital measure. Overall, our results are in line with prior 
predictions (see Fama and French, 1992; Easton, 2004). The coefficients of LnSIZE and BETA are 
significantly negative and positive, respectively, whilst the coefficients of LEV and LnB2M are both 
positive, but not significant
15
. These results offer us assurance that our estimates for the cost of equity 
capital are valid. Finally, although not significant, the coefficient of ACCOREPUT is negative in line 
with prior studies (e.g. Guenster et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011).   
In Model 2, we introduce RFDI only into the modelling to allow comparison of our results 
with previous studies that examine the effects of financial disclosure on the cost of equity capital. 
Our results show that the relationship between financial disclosure and the cost of capital is negative 
and significant only at the 10% level or better. This is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Amir and 
Lev, 1996; Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Espinosa and Trombetta, 2007). As noted 
earlier, prior literature (Amir and Lev, 1996; Nagar and Rajan, 2001; Pike, Rylander and Roos, 2002; 
Holland, 2006) suggests that IC combines with physical and financial assets to create value. 
Consistent with this, we introduce RICDI into the analyses (as in Model 3). In this case we are testing 
                                                 
15
 The insignificant results for LEV and LnB2M are consistent with other previous studies (see Richardson and Welker, 
2001; Botosan, Plumlee and Xie, 2004; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005). 
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whether IC disclosure and financial disclosure are individually and jointly related to the cost of 
equity capital, thus addressing hypothesis 1 (H1) and hypothesis 2 (H2). The results indicate that the 
coefficient of RICDI is negative and significant at the 5% level or better, supporting hypothesis 1 
(H1). The coefficient of RFDI is also negative and significant at the 5% level or better, thus 
hypothesis 2 (H2) is supported. We observe that when we introduce RICDI to Model 2, the 
coefficient of RFDI changes from a significance of 10% level to significant at the 5% level or better 
(in Model 3). These results suggest that the effect of financial disclosure in reducing the cost of 
equity capital is magnified by the presence of IC information. This confirms that when combined 
with IC disclosure, financial information has better incremental effect on the cost of equity capital 
(Amir and Lev, 1996; Pike, Rylander and Roos, 2002; Orens, Aerts and Lybaert, 2009). 
With regard to the notion that IC and financial assets interact to create value (e.g., Nagar and 
Rajan, 2001 Pike, Rylander and Roos, 2002; Holland, 2006), we introduce an interaction term 
(RFDI*RICDI) into the analyses. The results are reported in Table 5. 
 
 INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
As indicated in Model 4, we find that the coefficient of RICDI is still negative and significant at the 
5% level or better, but RFDI is no longer significant. The coefficient of RFDI*RICDI is positive and 
significant at the 5% level or better, thus our hypothesis 3 (H3) is supported. This implies that the 
interaction between IC and financial disclosure has an incremental effect on the cost of equity capital 
beyond that of the individual disclosure types. The fact that RICDI remains significant whilst RFDI 
is not suggests that the interaction between the disclosure types is such that the relationship between 
financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital depends on the level of IC disclosure (see Aiken 
and West, 1991). In this context, the positive interaction term implies that the impact of financial 
disclosure on the cost of equity capital is greater for high IC disclosure firms than for low IC 
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disclosure firms. To gain better insights into the interaction effects of the two disclosure types, we 
perform further analyses in which we partition our sample into three levels of IC disclosure to create 
low, medium and high IC disclosure categories and re-run the analyses. This approach is similar to 
Cheng, Collins and Huang (2006) and Muino and Trombetta (2009). Using the percentiles as 
reported in Table 2 (the descriptive statistics), we define low IC disclosure (LICDI) as 1 if 
ICDI≤0.623 (25th Quartile), 0 otherwise; medium IC disclosure (MICDI) as 1 if 0.623<ICDI<0.787 
(50
th
 Quartile), 0 otherwise and high IC disclosure (HICDI) as 1 if ICDI≥0.787 (75th Quartile), 0 
otherwise. Using this partitioning, we run the following regression model which takes LICDI as the 
base case:  
 
𝐾𝑃𝐸𝐺    = 0 + 1RFDI + 2MICDI + 3HICDI + 4RFDI*MICDI + 5RFDI*HICDI 
  + 6LnSIZE + 7BETA + 8LEV + 9LnB2M + 10ACCOREPUT  + j,    (3)  
 
The results are reported in Table 5 (Models 5 and 6). In Model 5, we include RFDI, MICDI and 
HICDI and find that the coefficient of MICDI is negative and significant at the 5% level or better, 
whilst both the coefficients of FDI and HICDI are only significant at the 10% level or better. When 
we interact both MICDI and HICDI with RFDI (Model 6), MICDI drops to a significance of only 
10% level or better, whilst RFDI and HICDI are no longer significant. With regard to the interaction 
term, we find that the coefficient of RFDI*MICDI is negative and significant at the 5% level or 
better, and RFDI*HICDI is also negative, but not significant. These results suggest that the effect of 
financial disclosure on the cost of equity capital is augmented for firms characterised by a medium 
level of intellectual capital disclosure.  
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5.2.2 Robustness checks 
To enhance the robustness of our results, we perform further analyses (1) using alternative measures 
of the cost of equity capital, (2) testing for endogeneity, and (3) including additional control 
variables. These are performed for the main models only (i.e. Model 3 in Table 4 and Model 4 in 
Table 5) and demonstrate that the results still hold, suggesting that our results are robust.  
Regarding the alternative measure of cost of equity capital, we use the Abnormal Earnings 
Growth (AEG) model, which is derived in Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) and is specified as 
follows: 
 
Ke= A +√𝐴2 + (
𝑒𝑝𝑠1
𝑃0
) ∗ (
𝑒𝑝𝑠2−𝑒𝑝𝑠1
𝑒𝑝𝑠1
) − (𝑦 − 1)      (4) 
Where: A = 
1
2
[y-1+dps₁/P₀]; 𝑒𝑝𝑠2is the two-year-ahead analysts’ earnings forecast for 
the firm; 𝑒𝑝𝑠1 is the one-year-ahead analysts’ earnings forecast for the firm;  𝑃0 
is the current share 
price; 𝑦 − 1 is the rate of perpetual growth in abnormal earnings beyond the forecast horizon, which 
is represented by the economy-wide growth (Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, 2005; Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2005)
16
; and 𝑑𝑝𝑠1  is the one-year-ahead dividend per share forecast. The results are 
reported in Table 6 (Models 7 to 9) and the results are largely similar to those in Tables 4 and 5.
17
 
  
   INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Second, prior studies (e.g., Nikolaev and van Lent, 2005; Orens, Aerts and Lybaert, 2009) 
argue that a major concern in using the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression approach is that of 
                                                 
16
 In our estimations, we assume an economy-wide growth rate of 3% as represented by the gross domestic product 
growth rate (see HM Treasury, 2008) 
17
 The cost of equity capital estimated by the AEG model is 10.46% and is highly correlated with the PEG estimates 
(correlation is 0.992). 
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endogeneity. In this respect, it is possible that, on the one hand, disclosure lead to a reduction in the 
cost of equity capital, whilst on the other hand, the cost of equity capital may influence a firm’s 
disclosure policy. This potential endogeneity problem may affect the interpretation of the results on 
the relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital. We test for this problem by 
applying a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. In the first stage, we estimate the regressions of 
RFDI and RICDI based on exogenous variables of the cost of capital together with instrumental 
variables. For the instrument variables, we include analyst following, listing age, sector, return on 
assets and multiple listing status (Models 10 and 11). Previous studies suggest that these variables are 
associated with disclosure (see for example, Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001; Li, Pike 
and Haniffa, 2008; Orens, Aerts and Lybaert, 2009). In the second stage, we re-run the cost of capital 
regressions by replacing RFDI and RICDI in our original models (see Models 3 and 4 in Tables 4 and 
5 respectively) with their predicted values (PREFDI and PREICDI) from the first-stage 2SLS 
estimations (Models 10 and 11). The results as reported in Table 7 (Models 12 and 13) remain similar 
to our original results. As in Model 3 (Table 4), Model 12 results (Table 7) show that both financial 
and IC disclosures are negatively related to the cost of equity capital. Similarly, as in Model 4 (Table 
5), Model 13 results indicate that IC disclosure is still negative and significant, whilst financial 
disclosure is not significant. Additionally, the interaction term is significant and positive. This 
analysis suggests that endogeneity might not significantly influence our results. 
   INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Finally, to our original model specification in Tables 4 and 5, we also add separately additional 
variables as a test of robustness (the results of these tests are not tabulated here). First, Lee, Walker 
and Christensen (2006) find that firms in knowledge-intensive sectors have higher equity premiums than 
other sectors due to greater uncertainty resulting from high growth, intense competition and shorter 
product life cycles. We therefore introduce, SECTOR, as an additional variable, which assumes a value 
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of 1 if the firm is classified as in knowledge-intensive sectors and 0 otherwise.
18
 Second, following 
Gietzmann and Ireland (2005) and Muino and Trombetta (2009), we include long-term growth 
(GROWTH) as an additional variable. We obtain long-term growth forecasts from I/B/E/S. Third, 
prior literature (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Richardson and Welker, 2001) shows that firms with low analyst 
following enjoy greater cost of capital benefits from enhanced disclosure. In this context, we partition 
our sample into low and high analyst following using a dummy variable (ANALYST) assuming 1 if 
number of analysts is below the median, and 0 otherwise. In all the three analyses above, we find that 
our results are similar to our original analyses.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we investigate whether IC and financial disclosures are jointly related to the cost of equity 
capital. We also analyse whether IC and financial disclosures interact to affect the cost of equity 
capital. The cost of equity capital is estimated using the PEG model (Easton, 2004) and both IC and 
financial disclosures are measured using a disclosure index approach. We find that IC disclosure is 
negatively related to the cost of equity capital, and the relationship between financial disclosure and 
the cost of equity capital is magnified when combined with IC disclosure. We also document 
evidence indicating that IC and financial disclosures interact in their effects on the cost of equity 
capital. The interaction term is positive implying that for firms with greater IC disclosures, the impact 
of financial disclosures on the cost of capital is greater than for firms with low IC disclosures. Further 
analyses partitioning IC disclosure into low, medium and high indicate that the effects of financial 
disclosure on the cost of equity capital are augmented for firms with a medium level of IC disclosure. 
These results are robust to alternative measures of the cost of equity capital, endogeneity and to the 
                                                 
18 The industry sectors that we classify as knowledge intensive are biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, IT, business service providers, 
telecommunications, banks and insurance, media and publishing, aerospace and defence, chemicals, and electronic and electrical 
equipment. We classify the remaining industries (real estate, mining, retailing, engineering, food and beverages and utility) as 
traditional sectors (see Bozzolan, O’Regan and Ricceri, 2005; Unerman, Guthrie and Striukova, 2007). We find that IC disclosure is 
higher for knowledge based sector firms (at 71.7%) than for traditional sector firms (at 66.4%) and using t-tests, we find the differences 
are significant at the 5% level. 
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inclusion of additional control variables.    
Our study makes important contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the limited 
literature on the relationship between the cost of equity capital and IC disclosure. Second, we document 
empirically, for the first time, that there is an interaction effect between IC and financial disclosure on 
the cost of equity capital. In this respect, our decision to disaggregate corporate disclosure into IC and 
financial disclosure provides additional insights into the disclosure-cost of capital relationship not 
examined in prior studies. Finally, our results have implications for policy and practice. An 
understanding of whether IC disclosure is associated with the firm’s cost of capital provides policy-
makers and regulators with a basis upon which to evaluate the costs and benefits of disclosure. The 
results are also important to managers of firms. They suggest that enhancing IC disclosure makes 
financial disclosures more meaningful for investors and also benefit the firm in terms of a reduction 
in the cost of equity capital. In this context, firms with low IC disclosure might consider improving 
the extent of IC disclosures to lower their cost of equity capital.   
Our findings must be interpreted in the context of at least two limitations. First, both cost of equity 
capital and levels of disclosure are difficult to measure. While this limitation must be noted, the 
reliability tests we conducted, based on similar prior studies, suggest that our results may be robust 
despite potential measurement errors in our main variables of interest.  Second, the study uses only 
equity capital and not debt, so that the cost of capital used does not reflect the firm’s total financing 
costs. A potential area of future research is to examine whether IC disclosures also affect the cost of debt 
financing as well.   
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APPENDIX A: DISCLOSURE CHECKLIST 
 
Panel A: Intellectual capital information disclosure items 
I. Structural capital   
1. Intellectual property 32. Relationship with suppliers 
2. Process 33. Business collaborations 
3. Management philosophy 34. Business agreements 
4. Corporate or organisational culture 35. Favourable contracts 
5. Organisational flexibility/adaptability 36. Research collaborations 
6. Organisational structure 37. Marketing 
7. Organisational learning 38. Relationship with stakeholders 
8. Research and development 39. Market leadership 
9. Innovation   
10. Technology III. Human capital 
11. Financial relationships 40. Number of employees 
12. Customer support function 41. Employee age 
13. Knowledge-based infrastructure 42. Employee diversity 
14. Quality management and improvement 43. Employee equality 
15. Accreditations 44. Employee relationship 
16. Overall infrastructure/capability 45. Employee education 
17. Networking 46. Skills/know-how/expertise/knowledge 
18. Distribution network 47. Employee work-related competences 
  48. Employee work-related knowledge 
II. Relational capital 49. Employee attitudes/behaviour 
19. Customers 50. Employee commitments 
20. Market presence 51. Employee motivation 
21. Customer relationship 52. Employee productivity 
22. Customer acquisition 53. Employee training 
23. Customer retention 54. Vocational qualification 
24. Customer training and education 55. Employee development 
25. Customer involvement 56. Employee flexibility 
26. Company image/reputation 57. Entrepreneurial spirit 
27. Company awards 58. Employee capabilities 
28. Public relationships 59. Employee teamwork 
29. Diffusion and networking 60. Employee involvement with community 
30. Brands 61. Other employee features 
31. Distribution channels   
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Panel B: Financial information disclosure items 
I. Financial analysis 19. Discussion of disposals and effects on results 
1. Profitability rations 20. Commentary on the effects of inflation on operations 
2. Cash flow ratios 21. Commentary on effects of interest rates on operations 
3. Liquidity ratios 22. Effects of foreign currency fluctuations on operations 
4. Gearing ratios 23. Effects of commodity prices on results 
5. Dividend cover ratio 24. Disclosure of capital expenditure in general 
6. Graphical presentation of key data 25. Quantitative geographical capital expenditure 
7. Analysis of free cash flows 26. Quantitative line of business capital expenditure 
8. Financial history summary 27. Creditor payment policy 
9. Comments on change in sales   
10. Comments on change in operating profit II. Forecast information 
11. Comments on change in cost of goods sold 28. Forecast of sales 
12. Comments on change in selling and 
administration expenses 
29. Forecast of profits 
13. Comments on change in interest expense or 
interest income 
30. Forecast of cash flows 
14. Comments on change in working capital 31. Order book or backlog information 
15. Discussion of capital structure   
16. Discussion of cash flow position III. Capital market data 
17. Commentary on level of borrowings 32. Share trading information 
18. Discussion of acquisitions and effects on 
results 
33. Share price information 
  34. Domestic and foreign shareholdings 
  35. Distribution of shareholdings by type of shareholders 
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Table 1: Sample composition by industry  
 
Industry Population 
size  
Initial 
sample size  
Final sample size 
   Number % 
Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals  40 13 10 7.9 
Information Technology 60 19 13 10.3 
Media and Publishing  45 14 12 9.5 
Business Service Providers  83 26 21 17.4 
Telecommunications Services 18 6 6 4.8 
Banks and Insurance  51 15 14 11.1 
Food and Beverages  22 7 7 5.6 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 45 14 5 4.0 
Retailing  20 6 6 4.8 
Utility 36 11 10 7.9 
Engineering  10 3 3 2.4 
Aerospace and Defence  11 3 3 2.4 
Chemicals  29 9 3 2.4 
Real Estate  40 13 8 6.3 
Mining  12 4 4 3.2 
Total number of firms 522 163 125 100 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Cost of equity capital, disclosure measures and control variables 
 
              Percentiles   
 
Variable Variable definitions Mean 25% Median 75% Standard  
       deviation 
 
K PEG
 Implied cost of capital     9.95% 7.24% 9.02% 11.32%         6.29% 
ICDI IC disclosure index             .700   .623   .721      .787                .1158 
FDI Financial disclosure index        .463   .388   .467      .539       .0943 
SIZE Market capitalisation (£m)   6,047.1 164.5 655.2 3,158.8  15,291.8 
BETA Market beta         .998   .775 1.020    1.235         .307 
LEV Financial leverage        .196   .063   .149      .286       .1928 
B2M Book-to-market ratio        .474   .251   .397      .663         .328 
 
Panel B: Cost of equity capital and disclosure measures by industry (means) 
Industry   Cost of equity capital IC disclosure Financial Disclosure 
    % % %   
Telecommunications services  13.59 72.7  45.6 
IT    12.02 71.8  41.5 
Aerospace and defence   11.50 70.5  54.9 
Utility    11.29 64.6  45.1 
Media and publishing   10.46 72.7  47.2 
Business service providers   10.11 70.1  43.4 
Banks and insurance   10.05 75.3  45.6 
Retailing      9.95 62.1  46.1 
Biotech and pharmaceuticals    9.80 71.8  48.5 
Electronic and electrical equipment    9.74 67.9  44.7 
Engineering      9.30 69.9  48.9 
Food and beverages     9.17 70.0  49.2 
Chemicals      7.03 68.8  41.9 
Real estate      6.70 62.1  46.1 
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Table 3: Pearson correlations among all variables 
 
 
Variableª K PEG
                RICDI RFDI SIZE BETA       LEV         B2M       ACCOREPUT 
 
K PEG  1.000
  
RICDI  -.344*** 1.000 
RFDI  -.250***   .559*** 1.000 
LnSIZE  -.392***   .406***   .322*** 1.000 
BETA   .203**            .103  -.196**  -.189** 1.000  
LEV   .094   .222**   .315***   .338***       -.110      1.000             
LnB2M  -.005  -.063  -.062   .010  -.172*     .207**     1.000 
ACCOREPUT -.257***   .433***   .369***   .530***   .059       .244***      -.131          1.000 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 **  Significant at the 5% level  
 *    Significant at the 10% level  
 
ª Variable Definitions: 
 
KPEG is the cost of equity measure imputed from the Easton (2004) model. RICDI denotes the rank of IC disclosure index; 
RFDI is the rank of financial disclosure index. LnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalisation at the end of the 
financial year of the firm. BETA is the firm’s market risk which is drawn from the Risk Measurement Service, which is a 
quarterly publication by the London Business School’s Institute of Finance and Accounting. LEV is the financial leverage 
of the firm calculated as total liabilities of the firm scaled by the firm’s market capitalisation at the financial year end. 
LnB2M is the natural log of the book-to-market ratio of the firm computed by scaling the book value of equity by the 
market capitalisation at the year end. ACCOREPUT denotes the accountability reputation of the firm, measured as a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is included in FTSE4GOOD index of socially responsible firms. The 
FTSE4GOOD index includes firms that perform well in the areas of environment, social and governance and we base our 
measure on the list published prior to the financial year end of the firms in our sample. 
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Table 4: Regression results for the relationship between disclosure and the cost of equity capital 
 
       
Variableª      Model 1     Model  2        Model 3  
                 (RFDI)   (RICDI & RFDI) 
 
Constant   .120             .120             .117  
                         (6.231***)         (6.150***)          (6.011***) 
LnSIZE      -.008            -.008            -.007 
                              (-3.345***)         (-3.132***)         (-2.386**) 
BETA      .022             .022              .022 
                               (2.108**)         (2.063**)           (1.995**) 
LEV            .021            .021              .023 
    (1.080)         (1.041)           (1.151) 
LnB2M            .005            .005              .006 
                          (1.034)                         (1.018)           (1.208) 
ACCOREPUT         -.001           -.001         -.00003 
      (-.924)          (-.797)            (-.833) 
RFDI                                      -         -.0001           -.0001 
                                      -        (-1.777*)          (-2.006**) 
RICDI          -              -           -.0001 
                       -          (-2.273**) 
  
Adjusted R²         .161            .181                  .239 
F-value       6.747***          5.855***               5.431*** 
Number      125                  125               125 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 **  Significant at the 5% level  
 *    Significant at the 10% level  
 
ª Variable Definitions: 
 
LnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalisation at the end of the financial year of the firm. BETA is the firm’s market 
risk which is drawn from the Risk Measurement Service, which is a quarterly publication by the London Business 
School’s Institute of Finance and Accounting. LEV is the financial leverage of the firm calculated as total liabilities of the 
firm scaled by the firm’s market capitalisation at the financial year end. LnB2M is the natural log of the book-to-market 
ratio of the firm computed by scaling the book value of equity by the market capitalisation at the year end. ACCOREPUT 
denotes the accountability reputation of the firm, measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is 
included in FTSE4GOOD index of socially responsible firms. The FTSE4GOOD index includes firms that perform well 
in the areas of environment, social and governance and we base our measure on the list published prior to the financial 
year end of the firms in our sample. RFDI and RICDI denote the ranks of financial disclosure index and IC disclosure 
index, respectively. 
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Table 5: Regressions of the cost of equity capital and disclosure interactions 
 
       
Variableª    Model 4             Model 5                 Model 6                                                                 
                            
 
Constant                                     .132                                      .113           .108                            
                      (6.557***)                            (5.967***)                       (4.798***)                      
LnSIZE                  -.006                          -.005          -.005                            
                                            (-2.085**)                            (-2.034**)                       (-2.029**)                       
BETA                       .025                         .025            .027                         
                                               (2.193**)                              (2.255**)                         (2.332**)                          
LEV                        .027                            .019            .020                               
                                                (1.387)                           (.970)          (.999)                          
LnB2M                       .005                            .005           .005                          
                                               (1.021)                                  (1.153)        (1.118)             
ACCOREPUT                      -.008                         -.008         -.010 
       (-.721)                        (-.747)                             (-.583) 
RFDI                                         -.0001                                    -.0001                               -.0001                         
                                          (-1.637)                                 (-1.889*)                            (-1.325)  
RICDI                                     -.001                                           -               -                          
                                           (-2.117**)                               -               -                            
RFDI*RICDI                   .00006                               -                    -                          
                                                 (2.353**)                                    -              -                          
MICDI                               -                                      -.030          -.022                                 
                                -                                   (-2.281**)                        (-1.925*)       
HICDI                                         -                                      -.024          -.033              
                                         -                       (-1.806*)       (-1.417)  
RFDI*MICDI              -   -        -.0001 
              -   -       (-2.209**) 
RFDI*HICDI                        -   -      -.00005 
-    -         (-.562) 
   
Adjusted R²                                 .251                           .242                                   .244                           
F-value                                      4.719***                             5.090***                          4.296***                     
Number                                        125                              125                                    125                               
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 **  Significant at the 5% level  
 *    Significant at the 10% level  
 
ª Variable Definitions: 
 
LnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalisation at the end of the financial year of the firm. BETA is the firm’s market 
risk which is drawn from the Risk Measurement Service, which is a quarterly publication by the London Business 
School’s Institute of Finance and Accounting. LEV is the financial leverage of the firm calculated as total liabilities of the 
firm scaled by the firm’s market capitalisation at the financial year end. LnB2M is the natural log of the book-to-market 
ratio of the firm computed by scaling the book value of equity by the market capitalisation at the year end. ACCOREPUT 
denotes the accountability reputation of the firm, measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is 
included in FTSE4Good index of socially responsible firms. The FTSE4Good index includes firms that perform well in 
the areas of environment, social and governance and we base our measure on the list published prior to the financial year 
end of the firms in our sample. RFDI and RICDI denote the ranks of financial disclosure index and IC disclosure index, 
respectively. RFDI*RICDI denotes the interaction term of the ranks of FDI and ICDI. MICDI denotes medium level IC disclosure 
measured as a dummy taking the value of 1 if 0.623<ICDI<0.787, 0 otherwise; and HICDI denotes high level IC disclosure 
and is measured as a dummy variable taking 1 if ICDI≥0.787, 0 otherwise. Finally, RFDI*MICDI and RFDI*HICDI are 
the interaction terms for financial disclosure (rank) and medium IC disclosure, and financial disclosure (rank) and high IC 
disclosure respectively. 
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Table 6: Regressions of the cost of equity capital and disclosure: Alternative measure of cost of equity capital using 
the Abnormal Earnings Growth (AEG) model 
 
       
Variableª   Model 7             Model 8                 Model 9                                                                 
                            
 
Constant                                     .123                                      .119           .137                            
                      (5.864***)                            (5.655***)                       (6.272***)                      
LnSIZE                  -.008                         -.006          -.005                            
                                            (-2.992***)                         (-2.046**)                        (-2.382**)                       
BETA                       .027                         .027            .030                         
                                               (2.216**)                             (2.199**)                          (2.381**)                          
LEV                        .005                           .007            .012                               
                                                 (.225)                          (.338)          (.575)                          
LnB2M                       .004                           .006           .005                          
                                                (.904)                                  (1.119)          (.921)             
ACCOREPUT                      -.004                         -.003          -.012 
       (-.351)                        (-.223)                              (-.976) 
RFDI                                         -                                     -.00006        -.0001                          
                                                     -                       (-1.815*)            (-1.544)                    
RICDI                                            -                                       -.0001                                 -.001                         
                                                 -                                      (-2.011**)                        (-2.240**)                         
RFDI*RICDI                            -                                         -          .0001                                 
                             -                                         -        (2.488**)       
 
Adjusted R²                                 .171                           .198                                   .223                           
F-value                                      6.122***                             4.827***                          5.185***                     
Number                                        125                              125                                    125              
                  
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 **  Significant at the 5% level  
 *    Significant at the 10% level  
 
ª Variable Definitions: 
 
LnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalisation at the end of the financial year of the firm. BETA is the firm’s market 
risk which is drawn from the Risk Measurement Service, which is a quarterly publication by the London Business 
School’s Institute of Finance and Accounting. LEV is the financial leverage of the firm calculated as total liabilities of the 
firm scaled by the firm’s market capitalisation at the financial year end. LnB2M is the natural log of the book-to-market 
ratio of the firm computed by scaling the book value of equity by the market capitalisation at the year end. ACCOREPUT 
denotes the accountability reputation of the firm, measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is 
included in FTSE4Good index of socially responsible firms. The FTSE4Good index includes firms that perform well in 
the areas of environment, social and governance and we base our measure on the list published prior to the financial year 
end of the firms in our sample. RFDI and RICDI denote the ranks of financial disclosure index and IC disclosure index, 
respectively. RFDI*RICDI is the interaction term of the ranks of FDI and ICDI.  
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Table 7: Tests for Endogeneity: A two-stage least square (2 SLS) approach 
 
              First Stage 2SLS   Second Stage 2SLS 
Variableª        Model 10         Model 11           Model 12                   Model 13 
                               RFDI           RICDI   
 
Constant    .245      .437                         .230 .681  
      (8.142***) (12.561***)  (3.818***)              (3.347***) 
LnSIZE       .017      .023          -.001                    -.0001 
  (2.835***)   (3.275***)  (-2.124**)             (-2.297**)  
BETA      --        --       .014 .019 
      --        --    (2.147**)               (2.057**)  
LEV     .038       .034       .038 .026 
    (.960)      (.743)   (1.122)                   (1.247) 
LnB2M      --      -.005       .006 .006 
      --     (-.407)   (1.263)                   (1.370) 
ACCOREPUT      --        --      -.004                      -.005 
      --        --      (-.958)                   (-.815) 
PRERFDI                                   --        --          -.086 -.033 
           --        --   (-1.947**)              (-1.537)  
PRERICDI                                  --        --              -.043                       -.251  
                                --        --   (-2.320**)              (-2.314**) 
PRERFDI*PRERICDI      --        --           --   .463 
      --        --              --                         (2.882***) 
ANALYST     .020      .035             -- --  
  (2.171**)   (2.448**)      -- --  
LISTAGE      .026       .001           -- --  
  (4.112***)      (.179)      -- -- 
SECTOR      .007       .054           -- --  
                              (.454)         (3.034***)      -- -- 
ROA    -.049      -.082       -- -- 
   (-.500)    (-.596)       -- -- 
MULTLIST     .009        --       -- -- 
  (1.983*)        --       -- -- 
   
Adjusted R²         .459        .512        .188 .218 
F-value       15.924***    19.604***   5.078***          5.279***        
Number        125           125      125           125 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level;  **  Significant at the 5% level;  *  Significant at the 10% level  
 
ª Variable Definitions: 
LnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalisation at the end of the financial year of the firm. BETA is the firm’s market 
risk which is drawn from the Risk Measurement Service, which is a quarterly publication by the London Business 
School’s Institute of Finance and Accounting. LEV is the financial leverage of the firm calculated as total liabilities of the 
firm scaled by the firm’s market capitalisation at the financial year end. LnB2M is the natural log of the book-to-market 
ratio of the firm computed by scaling the book value of equity by the market capitalisation at the year end. ACCOREPUT 
denotes the accountability reputation of the firm, measured as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is 
included in FTSE4Good index of socially responsible firms. The FTSE4Good index includes firms that perform well in 
the areas of environment, social and governance and we base our measure on the list published prior to the financial year 
end of the firms in our sample. PRERFDI and PRERICDI denote the predicted values of the ranks of FDI (RFDI) and 
ICDI (RICDI), respectively, from the first stage 2SLS, whilst PRERFDI*PRERICDI is the interaction term for the two. 
ANALYST is the number of analyst following the firm; LISTAGE is the company age measured as the number of years the 
firm has been listed on the stock exchange; SECTOR denotes sector classification, taking the value of 1 if the firm is 
classified as in the knowledge-intensive sector, and 0 otherwise; ROA the return on assets of the firm; and MULTLIST is 
multiple listing, measured as a dummy taking the value of 1 if the firm is listed on another stock exchange, and 0 
otherwise.   
